

RICHARD NIXON

August 13, 1987

26 FEDERAL PLAZA
NEW YORK CITY

CJ

*No Reply
phone*

533859

5200

SP1169

FC002-36

PR007-02

PR005-02

Dear Ron,

The speech last night was one of your best.
What was even more important than what you said was
that you sounded and looked strong. You gave the
lie to the crap about your being over-the-hill,
discouraged, etc.

If I could be permitted one word of advice:
Don't ever comment on the Iran-Contra matter again.
Have instructions issued to all White House
staffers and Administration spokesmen that they must
never answer any question on or off the record
about that issue in the future. They should reply
to all inquiries by stating firmly and
categorically that the President has addressed the
subject and that they have nothing to add.


The committee labored for nine months and
produced a stillborn midget. Let it rest in peace!

Sincerely,

Dick


The Honorable
Ronald Reagan

72

Mr. Walter
Christie


including elements
 figures in Soviet and - to certain selected
 countries. On an ~~average~~ ^{average}
 much wider. Why can
 we go

Thurs
 11/11/66



Jordanian

Iranian - Iranian



Original sent
 to Mrs. Kennedy
 Nov. 15, 1966

Notes made by President
 during meeting with Shah
 of Iran - April 12, 1962

1.]

Afghan

Afghan

2. News

Bonds
Rates

Iraq

Bonds

Iraq

Bonds Rates

Figures on Soviet aid - military & economic
to certain selected
demands
countries. Our needs
much wider. Why cut
us off.

Russian
equipment

Iraq

Syria - military training and
equipment

Egypt

Morocco

Indonesia

Sekou Toure - inaction

Bonds

KP-45
1962

April 12, 1962

Handwritten notes of President Kennedy written
during a meeting with His Imperial Majesty The
Shahanshah of Iran at 9:30 a.m.

1a
August 7, 1961

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 67

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Iran

The President has expressed renewed concern over the way in which the Amini regime seems to have lost much of its initial momentum and has had little success as yet in developing any kind of a political base. Moreover, we apparently face additional financial commitments to meet Iran's recurrent budget difficulties and to make up shortfalls in the second Seven Year Development Plan. He is anxious that we continue to do everything possible to capitalize on the opportunity created by Amini's advent, following up the excellent Iran Task Force program which he approved. If the situation seems to be deteriorating rather than improving, are there any further steps which the US could profitably undertake?

As a result he is most interested in the Department of State's current thinking. Should we now regard Iran as a fullfledged crisis situation, and give it sustained Task Force treatment, as we are South Vietnam? Are we doing everything necessary to keep Iran afloat financially and to get a promising development program going? Can we, for example, get the Shah and Amini to glamorize the new Third Plan as a bold new effort to modernize Iran, around which all elements of Iranian society should rally? What other means can we suggest to Amini to help generate a political base? How can we influence him to get a more competent cabinet? Is there anything more we can get the Shah to do to help Amini, such as allowing a token cut in the military budget? As to the opposition, is there any way we can help Amini to split the National Front and attach to himself its more moderate elements? Finally, if we are nonetheless dubious as to Amini's prospects, should we step up quiet contingency planning against his fall?

The President believes that it would be helpful if the Iran Task Force could prepare by the end of this week a follow-on report

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

MLK-592-5 (NSC letter 8/25/92)

By SP NARA Date 9/22/92

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

assessing what further measures, if any, seem desirable to forestall another Iranian crisis, and be ready to meet with him, if necessary, to consider these steps.

McGeorge Bundy

Information copies to:

Defense
International Cooperation Administration
Bureau of the Budget
Treasury
U. S. Information Agency
Central Intelligence Agency

cc: Mrs. Lincoln
McG. Bundy file
B. Smith/C. Johnson
R. Komer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

March 14, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 228

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

SUBJECT: Review of Iranian Situation

While I have approved the recent NSC 1550 determination concerning five year military assistance to Iran, I am concerned over the fulfillment of other aspects of the basic strategy which underlay my earlier approval of this military commitment, i.e. that it was intimately linked to an overall strategy for moving Iran toward more effective solutions to its crucial internal problems.

Therefore, I wish a review of our policy and programs in Iran. It should include: (a) analysis of the results achieved to date under our current policy, including the status of local development efforts and military force reductions; (b) our estimate of the likely course of events in Iran; and (c) recommendations, if any, for adaptation or revision of current strategy and programs in this key country. The following questions suggest the problems which I would like covered:

1. Is the thrust of existing U.S. policy toward Iran still basically valid? Is the strategy which it implies feasible under present circumstances?

2. Since the Shah has apparently committed himself to a politically motivated reform program, should we be doing anything to guide it, if possible, into constructive channels? Would active US assistance to this program further our interests? If not, what should be the US attitude?

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

By *mgm* NARS, Date *4/6/84*

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

3. What progress has been achieved during the past year in development of the Third Plan? What is the outlook for its use as the basis of effective development assistance by the U.S. and other donors?

4. What progress has been achieved in strengthening the public and private institutional framework for development in Iran? Are we getting satisfactory movement on integrated planning, establishment of priorities, budgetary controls, tax reforms, and other measures to mobilize Iranian resources for sound development?

5. What is the current and projected pattern of resource allocation among various elements of consumption and investment? Is there a satisfactory relationship between the ordinary budget, including military expenditures, and the development budget? Is the outlook encouraging in this respect?

6. How effectively is the combined use of all our instruments of foreign policy influencing the course of events in Iran? What results can reasonably be predicted from our present effort over the next two to five years?

7. If our existing policy and programs are no longer satisfactory, what changes should be made to produce better results?

I would appreciate a report by the Department of State, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, by 15 April 1963.

/s/ John F. Kennedy

cc:

Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Komer
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

~~SECRET~~